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Abstract
In this paper we study secure information ﬂow policies in the sense of Meadows [C. Meadows. Extending the Brewer-
Nash model to a multi-level context. IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy (1990) 95–102.]
and others for aggregated datasets, collectively. We ﬁrst present a method for combining different sensitivity levels over a
common dataset and investigate its ramiﬁcations on information ﬂow policies. Next, safe-ﬂow policies are formulated in full
generality using domain-theoretic tools, and systematically derived as closure operators from Scott continuous functions.
Maximum safe-ﬂow policies correspond to the top element of the lattice of the derived closure-operator collection. We
then introduce a categorical framework for information ﬂow, in which amalgamation is used to formulate and characterize
information-ﬂow policy merging.
Our methods for mediating information ﬂow policies should be of practical interest for information sharing among multiple
agencies. Our formulation of safe-ﬂow policies as closure operators from Scott continuous functions and the associated
categorical formulation of safe-ﬂow policy merging provide a sound and general theoretical foundation for the ﬁrst time for
this topic, setting a stage for further development in this area.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A possible way for determining a person’s identity is to use a combination of data items such as the last four
digits of SSN, zip code, date of birth, etc. Although each of the individual data items is relatively safe to be given
away, the aggregated data set can lead to “identity theft”. The culprit is the so-called functional dependence: the
combined information uniquely identiﬁes a person, and hence all other information about the person.
If we assign a sensitivity level to each individual data item, the data aggregate problem [2] refers to the phe-
nomenon that even though each individual data item has a low sensitivity level, their aggregate – the collection
of these data items considered together, may entail a higher sensitivity level.
Translated to order-theoretic terms, this means that the sensitivity level function is usually a monotonic, but
non-linear function, i.e., sups (or lattice sum, union) in the lattice of aggregated data sets need not be preserved
by the sensitivity level function.
For example, in Fig. 1, the sensitivity level of {x, y}, “top secret” (TS), is strictly higher than those of {x} and
{y}, “secret” (S). Although sensitivity levels are often ﬁnite structures in practical settings, one could use natural
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Fig. 1. Non-linearity of sensitivity level function.
numbers , real numbers , and even other structures such as ×  to model sensitivity levels (to be consistent
with the rest of the development, top and bottom elements should be added in these cases; also see Theorem
5). This would be helpful when ﬁner distinctions are to be captured by many sensitivity levels, but ﬁniteness
of the total number of sensitivity levels does not add anything. Instead, not requiring ﬁniteness may open up
connections with and offer insights from other mathematical structures which are normally not restricted to the
ﬁnite cases.
Business companies sometimes deal with the data-aggregate phenomenon on an ad hoc basis by incorpo-
rating time sensitive information. For example, in addition to the routine identity related information items,
some also request time-sensitive information such as “most recent transaction” as an added safety measure.
This reenforces the intuition that aggregated data has a higher sensitivity level, and the access of the additional,
implicit information is an indicator for someone with the privilege to access information at an even higher
sensitivity level.
Safe informationﬂow for aggregateddata sets and the corresponding security policies have notbeen addressed
in the past in a general order-theoretic framework. In this paper we study secure information ﬂow policies in
the sense of Meadows [12], Millen [13], and Kent [10] for aggregated datasets, collectively:
• we present a method for combining different sensitivity levels over a common dataset and investigate its
ramiﬁcations in information ﬂow policies;
• we exam safe-ﬂow policies using domain-theoretic methods to achieve a view of “information ﬂow as reverse
entailment”. Safe-ﬂow policies are systematically derived as a closure operator from a Scott continuous
function and maximum safe-ﬂow policy corresponds to the top element of the lattice of the derived closure-
operator collection;
• we introduce a categorical framework for information ﬂow, in which amalgamation is used to formulate and
characterize information-ﬂow policy merging.
Our work reveals additional insights and added dimensions over the existing body of knowledge on informa-
tion ﬂow for aggregated data sets. Our results represent the ﬁrst steps of an expansion of security research to the
unexplored but important area of combining security policies for sharing and collaboration among agencies.
2. Lattices
We ﬁrst recall some basic deﬁnitions of order theory and lattices to ﬁx notation. Our main reference is [7].
A partially ordered set (poset) is a set P with a reﬂexive, symmetric, transitive relation ⊆ P × P . If (P ,) is
a poset, then its dual is the poset (P ,). We denote posets by their carrier set as long as the partial order is
irrelevant or clear from the context.
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Deﬁnition 2.1. Consider a poset L. A non-empty subset D ⊆ L is directed if, for any x, y ∈ D, there is some
element z ∈ D such that x  z and y  z. If every directed subset D ⊆ L has a least upper bound (supremum,
join)
∨
D in L, then L is a directed complete partial order (dcpo). L is a complete lattice if every subset S ⊆ L
has a least upper bound
∨
S and a greatest lower bound (inﬁmum, meet)
∧
S .
Functions between partially ordered sets are the basic mechanism relating one poset to another.
Deﬁnition 2.2.Consider posetsD and E, and a function f : D → E. Then f ismonotone if it preserves the order
of D, i.e. whenever x  y in D, one ﬁnds f(x)  f(y) in E. Moreover, f is called Scott continuous if for any
(directed) S ⊆ D such that∨ S exists, one ﬁnds that∨ f(S) =∨{f(s) | s ∈ S} exists and that f(∨ S) =∨ f(S).
Note that preservation of directed suprema (inﬁma) always entails monotonicity, since every pair of ele-
ments x  y induces a directed set {x, y} for which preservation of suprema (inﬁma) implies f(x)  f(y) as
required.
Deﬁnition 2.3 [1]. A self-map, or an operator c : L → L on a complete lattice L is called a closure operator if it
is inﬂationary (i.e. x  c(x) for all x ∈ L), monotonic, and idempotent (i.e. c(c(x)) = c(x) for all x ∈ L).
Lemma 2.1. For a complete lattice L, the set of all closure operators on it forms a complete lattice again, under the
coordinatewise order: c1  c2 if c1(x)  c2(x) for all x ∈ L.
Lemma 2.1 is folklore; we provide a concise and direct proof.
Proof. Let C be the collection of closure operators on L. We ﬁrst show that the operator ∧ C, deﬁned as
(
∧ C)(x) :=∧c∈C c(x) for each x ∈ L, is again a closure operator. The required monotonicity and inﬂationary
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for each ci in C.
This shows that arbitrary meet exists for the set of all closure operators on L. Since the closure operator that
maps everything to top is the largest operator, the join of a set of operators can be obtained as the meet of all
closure operators above them. 
3. Information ﬂow for ﬁnite sets
In order to set a proper stage for our work, we ﬁrst introduce secure information ﬂow policies for ﬁnite
sets under the closure-operator setting. This will be compared with Meadows’ notion for intuition and for the
appreciation of the signiﬁcance of the developments to follow.
It is natural to consider aggregated data sets to be comprised of primitive data items, and any combination
of those data items are possible. Thus the data space can be taken to be a powerset lattice of the form 2X , where
1416 G.-Q. Zhang / Information and Computation 205 (2007) 1413–1425
X is the set of primitive data items under consideration. In the security literature, X is assumed to be ﬁnite. This
turns out to be an unnecessary restriction. However, it makes sense to consider information ﬂow between ﬁnite
data sets only, which are compact elements in the algebraic lattice (2X ,⊆) (see Deﬁnition 4.3).
With respect to security of access policies, if a data set is enlarged, the sensitivity level should not decrease.
Therefore the sensitivity level function must be a monotonic function. As pointed out earlier, however, such a
function cannot be assumed linear, in the sense that the sensitivity level of a data set cannot be required to be
equal to the least upper bound of those of its individual parts. This is sometimes referred to as the “aggregation
problem”. Meadows proved in 1990 a theorem about information ﬂow in aggregates, which we will refer to as
the “Maxmum Safe-Flow Theorem” [12,13]. We brieﬂy recall Meadows’ result in this section, reformulating it
with a more order-theoretic ﬂavor in preparation for a more general formulation in the next section.
Deﬁnition 3.1. A dataset aggregate system is a triple
(X ,L, )
where X is a ﬁnite collection of “datasets”, L is a lattice of sensitivity levels, and  : 2X → L is a monotone
function assigning a lattice element (ordinarily a sensitivity level) to each collection of datasets.
The rationale for choosing a lattice structure for sensitivity levels appeared ﬁrst in [2]. Meadows’ result con-
cerns information ﬂow policies. We introduce a regrouping of the properties in the deﬁnitions of ﬂow policy
and safe ﬂow policy so that a ﬂow policy is monotonic, transitive, and aggregative, leaving the maintenance of
sensitivity levels as the sole signature for safety. This way, ﬂow policies are a certain kind of closure operators.
Since we are most interested in safe ﬂow policies, this adjustment allows us to clearly delineate and focus on the
property essential to safety.
Deﬁnition 3.2 [Flow Policy]. An operator c : 2X → 2X is a ﬂow policy if it is a closure operator.
In contrast, Meadows’ ﬂow policy is a transitive relation R ⊆ 2X × 2X , written in inﬁx form as →R, that
extends set inclusion on sets of datasets. That is, for all u, v ⊆ X ,
R is a transitive relation on 2X , and
R is monotonic: u ⊆ v ⇒ u →R v.
A ﬂow policy is safe if it respects the order on sensitivity levels.
Deﬁnition 3.3 [Safe Flow Policy]. A safe ﬂow policy is a closure operator c : 2X → 2X that respects sensitivity
levels, i.e., for any x, y ⊆ X ,
x ⊆ c(y) ⇒ (x) ⊆ (y).
It should be helpful again to recallMeadows’ safe ﬂow policy, with safety deﬁned in terms of two independent
conditions, i.e.:
(1) it respects the sensitivity level mapping: u →R v ⇒ (u)  (v), and
(2) it is aggregative: (u →R w & v →R w) ⇒ (u ∪ v) →R w.
The idea behind Meadows’ safe ﬂow policy is that if u →R v, then information is permitted to ﬂow from u to
v: a subject with a sufﬁciently high access-level to read v will also have sufﬁcient access-level to read u. If both
u and v can ﬂow to w, then their combined information can be aggregated in w, so w must be assigned a high
enough aggregated level. The intent is to make sure that when ﬂows are permitted, the destination data object
is labeled a high enough sensitivity level to protect information in the aggregated content.
Meadows’ formulation has the advantage that it is intuitive, and our new formulation has the advantage that
it is conceptually more elegant and easier to generalize. In the next section we present a generalized formula-
tion of safe ﬂow policies and show (in Theorem 4.1) that the two formulations are equivalent in the setting of
powersets (equivalence in full generality does not apply, becauseMeadows’ formulation hinges upon powersets).
An important result is Meadows’ Maximal Safe-Flow Theorem, which states that there exists a unique max-
imal safe ﬂow policy and gives a characterization of it (see Theorem 2.5, [12]). The following result appears in
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[13] and uses Meadows’ formulation of safe ﬂow policy. It is quoted here to set the background for our more
general maximal safe-ﬂow result (Theorem 4.2, item 3).
Theorem 3.1 [Maximal Safe-Flow Theorem]. Let (X ,L, ) be a dataset aggregate system, and let R be the ﬂow
policy deﬁned by
u →R v ⇐⇒ ∀w ⊆ X , (u ∪ w)  (v ∪ w).
Then R is the unique maximal safe ﬂow policy.
This result is conceptually important. It says that there always exists a ﬂow policy that permits maximal
information ﬂow, and it is the only one determined by the property that aggregation with any additional data
item does not violate the constraint imposed by sensitivity level. A consequence of this result is that the maximal
safe ﬂow policy is determined by ﬂows from single elements (Lemma 2.6, [12]).
4. General dataset aggregate systems
In this section we provide a general formulation of the data aggregate problem and recast Meadows proof
as a universal closure operator derived from a Scott continuous function. Since closure operators are intimately
related to logical entailment [14–17], this allows us to conceptually view information ﬂow as reverse entailment.
Deﬁnition 4.1. A general dataset aggregate system (GDAS) is a Scott continuous function  : D → L, where D
and L are complete lattices.
There seems to be nothing special with GDASs merely from this deﬁnition; the distinction comes from new
aspects we explore next in the direction of ﬂow policies.
First, we look for an appropriate formulation of a safe ﬂow policy (see Deﬁnition 3) in GDASs.
Deﬁnition 4.2. Let  : D → L be a GDAS. A ﬂow policy for (D,L, ) is simply a closure operator c on D. A safe
ﬂow policy for (D,L, ) is a closure operator c that respects sensitivity levels, i.e., for any x, y ∈ D,
x  c(y) ⇒ (x)  (y).
This additional property will be referred to as the safety condition, which is equivalent to requiring c(x) 
c(y) ⇒ (x)  (y) for all x, y ∈ D.
We illustrate how this deﬁnition relates to the deﬁnitions for ﬁnite powersets given in the previous section.
Theorem 4.1. Let (X ,L, ) be a dataset aggregate system as given in Deﬁnition 3.1.We have:
(1) If a relation →R⊆ 2X × 2X is a safe ﬂow policy in the sense of Meadows, then the operator cR deﬁned as
cR(x) :=⋃{y | y →R x} for x ∈ 2X is a safe ﬂow policy in the sense of Deﬁnition 3.
(2) If an operator c : 2X → 2X is a safe ﬂow policy in the sense of Deﬁnition 3, then the relation →c deﬁned by
u →c v if and only if u ⊆ c(v), is a safe ﬂow policy in the sense of Meadows.
(3) The previous two items determine a bijection between safe ﬂow policies as given in Deﬁnition 3 and safe ﬂow
policies in the sense of Meadows.
Proof.
1. Suppose →R is a safe ﬂow policy in the sense of Meadows. Then x ⊆ cR(x) for any x ∈ 2X because x →R x.
Hence cR is inﬂationary. Suppose x ⊆ y . If z →R x, then by transitivity, z →R y , and hence cR(x) ⊆ cR(y). This
shows that cR is monotonic. To show that cR is idempotent, it sufﬁces to show that cR(cR(x)) ⊆ cR(x) for any
x ∈ 2X . Suppose y →R cR(x) for some x ∈ 2X . Since R is aggregative and X is ﬁnite, we obtain cR(x) →R x. Now
by the above, y →R x follows from transitivity and we have shown that y ∈ {z | z →R x}. So cR(cR(x)) ⊆ cR(x)
and cR is a closure operator.
Suppose x ⊆ cR(y). As noted before, we have cR(y) →R y . Therefore, x →R y , by monotonicity and transi-
tivity of R. Being a safe ﬂow policy in the sense of Meadows, R respects sensitivity levels. Therefore, (x)  (y).
2. First, →c is transitive, for assuming u ⊆ c(v) and v ⊆ c(w), we have c(v) ⊆ c(w) by the monotonicity and
idempotency of c as a closure operator. Hence u ⊆ c(w). Themonotonicity of→c in the sense ofMeadows easily
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follows from the inﬂationary property of c as a closure operator. The aggregative property of →c is obvious.
What remains to be shown is that →c respects sensitivity level mapping, i.e., if u ⊆ c(v), then (u)  (v). But
this is precisely what Deﬁnition 4.2 provides.
3. Let c be a safe ﬂow policy. It is clear that c = c→c because for any x ⊆ X ,
c→c(x) =
⋃{y | y ⊆ c(x)} = c(x).
We also have R =→cR , because for any x, y ⊆ X ,
x →cR y ⇔ x ⊆ cR(y)
⇔ x ⊆⋃{u | (u, y) ∈ R}
⇔ x ⊆⋃{u | (u, y) ∈ R} & ⋃{u | (u, y) ∈ R} →R y
⇔ x →R y
where the second last step follows from the fact that R is an aggregative relation and X is a ﬁnite set, and the
last step follows from transitivity and monotonicity of R. 
Lemma 2.1 tells us that the set of all closure operators on a complete lattices again forms a complete lattice;
but it does not inform us about the order-theoretic property of safe ﬂow policies. Now we can follow Deﬁnition
4.2 in studying safe ﬂow policies, thanks to Theorem 4.1. We show that the collection of safe ﬂow policies forms
a complete lattice as well. As a ﬁrst step, we establish the existence of the top element, generalizing Meadows’
Maximal Safe-Flow Theorem (Thm. 3).
Theorem 4.2. Suppose  : D → L is a GDAS. Then
(1) for any x ∈ D, the set {y | ∀z ∈ D. (y ∨ z)  (x ∨ z)} is non-empty and directed.
(2) let the operator ( )∗ : D → D be deﬁned as
(x)∗ :=
∨
{y | ∀z ∈ D. (y ∨ z)  (x ∨ z)}.
Then ( )∗ is a closure operator. For all x, y ∈ D, ((x)∗ ∨ y) = (x ∨ y).Moreover, x  (y)∗ implies (x) 
(y). So ( )∗ is a safe ﬂow policy.
(3) ( )∗ is the largest safe ﬂow policy, i.e., it is the largest closure operator under the coordinatewise order among
all those respecting the security level function .
Proof.
(1). The set in question is clearly non-empty. Let
y1, y2 ∈ {y | ∀z ∈ D. (y ∨ z)  (x ∨ z)}.
Then for any z ∈ D, we have
(y1 ∨ (y2 ∨ z))  (x ∨ (y2 ∨ z))
= (y2 ∨ (x ∨ z))
 (x ∨ (x ∨ z))
= (x ∨ z).
Therefore, y1 ∨ y2 ∈ {y | ∀z ∈ D (y ∨ z)  (x ∨ z)}.
(2). Item (1) establishes ( )∗ as a well-deﬁned operator. It is clearly inﬂationary and monotonic. To show that
it is idempotent, it sufﬁces to show that ((x)∗ ∨ z)  (x ∨ z) for any x, z ∈ D. We have
((x)∗ ∨ z) = (z ∨∨{y | ∀t ∈ D. (y ∨ t)  (x ∨ t)})
= (∨{(y ∨ z) | ∀t ∈ D. (y ∨ t)  (x ∨ t)})
(continuity of ∨)
=∨{(y ∨ z) | ∀t ∈ D. (y ∨ t)  (x ∨ t)})
(continuity of )
 (x ∨ z).
(let t = z)
In particular, this shows that ((x)∗) = (x) for all x ∈ D. Suppose x  (y)∗ for some x, y ∈ D. By the monoto-
nicity of , (x)  ((y)∗) = (y). Therefore, (x)  (y).
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(3). Suppose c is a closure operator that respects the security level function. We show that for any x ∈ D,
c(x)  (x)∗, where ( )∗ is the safe ﬂow policy established in (2). By the deﬁnition of ( )∗, it sufﬁces to show
that for every z ∈ D, (c(x) ∨ z)  (x ∨ z). This is true by noting c(x) ∨ z  c(x ∨ z) and applying
Deﬁnition 4.2. 
Since in ﬁnite lattices anymonotonic function is Scott continuous,Meadows’ (Theorem 2.5, [12]) result can be
seen as a corollary of Theorem 4.2 by lettingD = 2X and u →R v if and only if u ⊆ (v)∗. Note that the continuity
of  is critical for Theorem 4.2 to be valid for general D.
The upshot of Theorem 4.2 is that by letting v  u if and only if u ⊆ (v)∗, one can readily check that  is
reﬂexive, transitive, and monotonic, satisfying the axioms of information systems in the sense of Scott [14,
17], and hence is an entailment relation. It is in this sense that we say information ﬂow (→) is the reverse of
entailment (), taking continuous functions as the generators.
Since safe ﬂow policies are closure operators, the meet
∧ C of an arbitrary set of safe ﬂow policies C with
respect to a GDAS  : D → L is again a closure operator, according to Lemma 2.1. Suppose for some x, y ∈ D,
x  (∧ C)(y). Then x  c(y) for each c ∈ C. If C is not empty, then (x)  (y) sine c is a safe ﬂow policy. If
C is empty, then by convention ∧ C = ( )∗ and we still have (x)  (y). Hence ∧ C is a safe ﬂow policy. We
have in effect proved the following.
Proposition 4.1. The set of all safe ﬂow policies with respect to a GDAS  : D → L is a complete lattice.
Deﬁnition 4.3. An element c in a dcpo D is called compact if for every directed set S ⊆ D, c ∨ S implies
c  s for some s ∈ S . The set of all compact elements of D will be denoted by K(D). A complete lattice L is an
algebraic lattice, if for every element x ∈ L, we have x =∨(↓x ∩ K(L)).
Compactness and algebraicity are important notations capturing how inﬁnite information content can be
approximated systematically by pieces of ﬁnite information content. In a complete lattice L, if a, b ∈ K(L) then
a ∨ b ∈ K(L).
A typical example of algebraic lattices is the powerset lattice 2X , i.e. the complete lattice of all subsets of X
under inclusion. Finite subsets of X are precisely the compact elements in this case.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose  : D → L is a GDAS. Let D∗ := {x∗ | x ∈ D} carry the ordering inherited from D. Then
D∗ is an algebraic lattice if D is algebraic, and ( )∗ : D → D∗ is Scott continuous.
Proof.We show thatD∗ contains “enough” compact elements, and is therefore algebraic. This can be achieved by
showing that ( )∗ preserves compactness. Suppose c ∈ D is compact. Suppose inD∗ we have c∗ ∨{x∗i | i ∈ I},
where {x∗i | i ∈ I} is a directed subset ofD∗ (hence it is also a directed subset ofD). Since c  c∗ and c is compact,
there exists i ∈ I , such that c  x∗i . Therefore, c∗  (x∗i )∗ = x∗i , as required.
The continuity of ( )∗ follows a similar proof as that of Item (2) of Lemma 4.2. 
For an algebraic lattice D, let idD : D → D be the identity Scott continuous function. Then x∗ = x for each
x ∈ D and D ∼= D∗.
A related question is whether every closure operator on a complete lattice D can be seen as one arising from
a GDAS. The next result shows that this is indeed true for Scott continuous closure operators.
Proposition 4.3. Suppose c is a Scott continuous closure operator on a complete lattice D. Then there exists a
GDAS  : D → L such that ( )∗ = c, where ( )∗ is the induced closure operator according to Theorem 4.2.
Proof. Let the GDAS be c : D → D, i.e., c = . By Theorem 4.2, ( )∗ is well-deﬁned. For any x, y ∈ D, if
c(y ∨ z)  c(x ∨ z) for all z ∈ D then y  c(y)  c(y ∨ x)  c(x). Therefore,
c(x) 
∨
{y | ∀z ∈ D. c(y ∨ z)  c(x ∨ z)}.
On the other hand, for any x, z ∈ Dwehave c(x) ∨ z  c(x ∨ z)by themonotonicity of c. Therefore, c(c(x) ∨ z) 
c(x ∨ z) because c is idempotent. This implies that c(x) ∈ {y | ∀z ∈ D. c(y ∨ z)  c(x ∨ z)}, and so
c(x) 
∨
{y | ∀z ∈ D. c(y ∨ z)  c(x ∨ z)}.
Thus (x)∗ = c(x) for any x ∈ D, as required. 
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5. Mediating sensitivity levels
When it comes to multiple agencies sharing data, the issue of information ﬂow policy becomes more com-
plicated. Different agencies may assign different sensitivity levels to common data sets, even assuming the same
sensitivity level sets are used.Different agenciesmay share somedata itemsbutmay also keep some to themselves.
For a concrete toy example, consider two agencies A and B who assign slightly different sensitivity levels
to shared data items {x, y , z}. Suppose agency A’s assignment is as given in Fig. 1, and agency B assigns {z}
the sensitivity level S , with the rest in agreement with A. How should the differences be mediated to obtain an
overall coherent picture? How about information ﬂow policies in the combined setting? This motives the topic
for this section: how may different sensitivity level mappings be combined to obtain a combined information
ﬂow policy?
Theorem 5.1 [Sensitivity Merging]. Let 1, 2 : D → L be GDASs, and let c1 and c2 be safe ﬂow policies for 1 and
2, respectively. Deﬁne, for any x ∈ D,
(c1 ∧ c2)(x) := c1(x) ∧ c2(x).
Then c1 ∧ c2 is a safe ﬂow policy with respect to both ∧ and ∨, where
(1) ∧ is deﬁned as ∧(x) := 1(x) ∧ 2(x) for any x ∈ D and
(2) ∨ is deﬁned as ∨(x) := 1(x) ∨ 2(x) for any x ∈ D.
The signiﬁcance of this result is that when sensitivity levels are combined by taking either pointwise join
or pointwise meet, a safe ﬂow policy can be obtained by taking the intersection of safe ﬂow policies of the
components (considered as operators as facilitated by Theorem 4.1).
Proof. Note that by Lemma 2.1, the meet c1 ∧ c2 is a closure operator and so all we need to check is safety. We
need to show that for any x, y ∈ D, if x  c1(y) ∧ c2(y) then ∧(x)  ∧(y) and then ∨(x)  ∨(y). Since both
c1 and c2 are safe, and x  c1(y) and x  c2(y), we have 1(x)  1(y) and 2(x)  2(y). Hence the required
inequalities follow easily. 
However, there is no guarantee that the resulting policy permits maximal information ﬂow (which can be
considered as secondary in comparison to safety) when those permitting maximal information ﬂows for each
component are combined this way. For example, suppose ( )∗1 and ( )
∗
2 are maximal information ﬂow policies
for 1 and 2, respectively. Then we only have
(x)∗1 ∧ (x)∗2 
∨
{y | ∀z ∈ D. ∧(y ∨ z)  ∧(x ∨ z)},
or
∨{y1 ∧ y2 ∈ D | ∀z ∈ D. 1(y1 ∨ z)  1(x ∨ z) and 2(y2 ∨ z)  2(x ∨ z)}
∨{y | ∀z ∈ D. (1 ∧ 2)(y ∨ z)  (1 ∧ 2)(x ∨ z)},
using the continuity of ∧ and the fact that i((y1 ∧ y2) ∨ z)  i(yi ∨ z)  i(x ∨ z) (where i = 1, 2) implies
(1 ∧ 2)((y1 ∧ y2) ∨ z)  (1 ∧ 2)(x ∨ z).
Although the other direction of the inequality (as needed to show maximal ﬂow) does not hold in general, it
is possible to preserve maximal information ﬂow by modifying the domain of sensitivity levels, as shown in the
next result.
Theorem 5.2. Let 1, 2 : D → L be GDASs, and let ( )∗1 and ( )∗2 be maximal safe ﬂow policies for 1 and 2,
respectively. Then ( )∗1 ∧ ( )∗2 is a maximal safe ﬂow policy with respect to  : D → L× L, where for each x ∈ D,
(x) := (1(x), 2(x)) and L× L is the cartesian product with coordinatewise order.
Proof. By Theorem 4.2, it sufﬁces to show that for any x ∈ D,
(x)∗1 ∧ (x)∗2 =
∨
{y | ∀z ∈ D. (y ∨ z)  (x ∨ z)}.
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(). Suppose, by the continuity of∧ (one can easily check by following deﬁnitions that∧ is always continuous
in each of its arguments), y1 ∧ y2 is such that 1(y1 ∨ z)  1(x ∨ z) and 2(y2 ∨ z)  2(x ∨ z) for all z ∈ D. Then
1((y1 ∧ y2) ∨ z)  1(x ∨ z) and 2((y1 ∧ y2) ∨ z)  2(x ∨ z). Hence ((y1 ∧ y2) ∨ z)  (x ∨ z) for all z ∈ D
and we have y1 ∧ y2 ∈ {y | ∀z ∈ D. (y ∨ z)  (x ∨ z)}.
(). Suppose, on the other hand, y ∈ {y | ∀z ∈ D. (y ∨ z)  (x ∨ z)}. Then 1(y ∨ z)  1(x ∨ z) and
2(y ∨ z)  2(x ∨ z) for all z ∈ D and we have y ∈ {s | ∀z ∈ D. 1(s ∨ z)  1(x ∨ z)} as well as y ∈ {t | ∀z ∈
D. 2(t ∨ z)  2(x ∨ z)}. Therefore, y  (x)∗1 ∧ (x)∗2. 
Theorem 5.2 conﬁrms that maximal safe ﬂow policy can be obtained from those of the component systems.
The cost is in using a modiﬁed sensitivity value domain, which may not be desirable, depending on applications.
6. Merging information ﬂow policies as amalgamation
In the previous section we looked into the issue of mediating sensitivity levels from different GDASs with the
same datasets. In this section we study information ﬂow policies among GDASs where both the datasets and
the sensitivity level maps may differ. We provide a categorical formulation for information ﬂow policies using
slices [11] and employ Droste-Göbel’s amalgamation [3,4] techniques for domains for merging GDASs.
Similar to previous sections, all our results below directly translate to the traditional ﬁnite powerset setting
which will not be explicitly restated.
Deﬁnition 6.1. Let L be the category of complete lattice and Scott continuous functions. Let L be a complete
lattice. The slice (L ↓ L) of objects over L is a category consisting of objects  : D → L and maps
such that the diagram commutes.
(L ↓ L) is a suitable setting for discussing GDASs because the objects of this category are GDASs with a
ﬁxed sensitivity domain L.
Proposition 6.1. Suppose the function h in the diagram of Deﬁnition 6.1 is onto and respects ∨. Then for any
x ∈ D, h(x∗) = (h(x))∗.
Proof.
h(x∗) = h(∨{y | ∀z ∈ D. (y ∨ z)  (x ∨ z)})
= ∨{h(y) | ∀z ∈ D. (′ ◦ h)(y ∨ z)  (′ ◦ h)(x ∨ z))}
(continuity of h; ′ ◦ h = )
= ∨{h(y) | ∀z ∈ D. ′(h(y) ∨ h(z))  ′(h(x) ∨ h(z)))}
(h respects ∨)
= ∨{h(y) | ∀z ∈ D′. ′(h(y) ∨ z)  ′(h(x) ∨ z))}
(h is onto)
= ∨{y ′ | ∀z ∈ D′. ′(y ′ ∨ z)  ′(h(x) ∨ z))}
(h is onto)
= (h(x))∗ 
Webrieﬂy introduce some terminologies beforemoving tomerging information ﬂow policies. Readers should
refer to [3,4] for closely related notions.
Deﬁnition 6.2. Let f : D → E and g : E → D be maps in the category L. The pair (f , g) is called an embedding-
projection pair from D to E if g ◦ f = idD and f ◦ g  idE . A subset S of a complete lattice D is covered by D,
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written S  D, if S inherits the order from D and for any s ∈ S and d ∈ D, s ∧ d (with ∧ taken from D) is a
member of S ,
Note that if S  D and S is a complete lattice as well, then x ∧S y = x ∧D y for all x, y ∈ S . This is because if
z ∈ D and z D S , then z = z ∧D S ∈ S . With this in mind, we will keep the notation for meet polymorphic.
The proof for the next proposition is straightforward.
Proposition 6.2. SupposeD  D′ inL.Then (f , g) is an embedding-projection pair,where f : D → D′ is the identity
map, g(y) := D ∧ y for all y ∈ D′, and D is the top element of D.
The next result shows that safe ﬂow policies for a larger data collection restrict to ones for sub-collections, if
the coverage condition in Deﬁnition 6.2 is satisﬁed.
Proposition 6.3. Let the diagram
be such that D ⊆ E and (f , g) is an embedding-projection pair. Then any safe ﬂow policy cE on E induces a safe
ﬂow policy cD on D, deﬁned by cD(d) := g(cE(d)), for all d ∈ D.
Proof.Without loss of generality assumef to be an inclusion (identity). Let cE be a safe ﬂowpolicywith respect to
 : E → L. Then cD is well-deﬁnedmonotonic.We have d  cE(d), so d = (g ◦ f)(d) = g(d)  g(cE(d)) = cD(d).
So cD is inﬂationary. For idempotency, note that we have d  cD(d)  cE(d). Therefore,
cE(d)  cE(cD(d))  cE(cE(d)) = cE(d),
and so cE(cD(d)) = cE(d). Now we have cD(cD(d)) = g(cE(cD(d))) = g(cE(d)) = cD(d), as required. Therefore
cD is a ﬂow policy.
For safety, suppose x  cD(y) for some x, y ∈ D. This means x  g(cE(y))  cE(y). Since cE is safe, we have
(x)  (y). 
We now consider the merging of GDASs with a common sensitivity domain. The notion of merging is
important in a variety of settings, since it provides a basis for a disciplined way for sharing data, as well as an
algorithmic foundation for implementation. In ontological engineering, this important topic has been addressed
as the categorical construction of pushout by a number of researchers, e.g. Goguen [8], Hitzler et al. [9], and Kent
[10].
It makes sense to also consider formulating the merging of GDASs as a pushout in the category (L ↓ L).
However, the sensitivity level mapping is an independent parameter from the underlying data structures, and it
cannot be uniquely determined, as needed by the universality property that comeswith the pushout construction.
For this reason, we settle with the next best thing, i.e., merging as amalgamation.
Amalgamation has been studied extensively by Droste and Göbel for the existence and construction of
universal domains in the theory of programming languages [3,4] following the idea of the model-theoretic result
of Fraissé-Jónsson [6]. Most recently, amalgamation has been shown to be a useful conceptual tool for the
existence of certain causal sets in discrete space-time quantum gravity [5].
Amalgamation is essentially pushout without necessarily the uniqueness of the merged structure. It is an explicit
construction that guarantees that the underlying data structures are merged in the most conserved manner as
possible, leaving room only for the additional decorations that are somewhat external to the data structure and
cannot be uniquely determined.
Deﬁnition 6.3. SupposeD,E1,E2 ∈ L are three complete lattices such thatD  E1,D  E2,D = E1 ∩ E2. Deﬁne a
poset F with F = E1 ∪ E2 and for any x, y ∈ F , x F y if and only if either x, y ∈ E1 and x E1 y , or else x, y ∈ E2
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and x E2 y . Then F is called the amalgam of E1,E2 over D if it has a top element; Otherwise the amalgam of
E1,E2 over D is F with a top element attached.
Note that our deﬁnition slightly differs from those given in [3,4]; Droste and Göbel consider a more general
amalgam construction for arbitrary posets. However, the related proofs are similar and hence omitted.
Proposition 6.4 ([4], Lemma 4.4(c)). In L, the amalgam of E1,E2 over D is a complete lattice.
Theorem 6.1 ([4], Lemma 4.4(a)). Let F be the amalgam of E1,E2 over D in L. Then Ei  F for i = 1, 2.
With these preparations, we are ready to state the main result of this section with respect to the merging of
GDASs in the slice category (L ↓ L).
Theorem 6.2. Let the commutative diagram
in (L ↓ L) be such thatD = E1 ∩ E2,D  Ei , andfi the identitymaps, for i = 1, 2.Then there exists amap : F → L
in L such that the diagram
commutes, with Ei  F and gi identity maps, for i = 1, 2.
Proof (Sketch). The key content of the proof resides in Theorem 6.1, which guarantees the existence of F . We




(x), if x ∈ E1 ∩ E2 (I)
1(x) if x ∈ E1 \ E2 (II)
2(x) if x ∈ E2 \ E1 (III)
1(E1) ∨L 2(E2) otherwise
The monotonicity of  follows from those of , i , i = 1, 2 and the fact that D  Ei  F for i = 1, 2. For con-
tinuity, note that for any directed set T ⊆ E1 ∪ E2, if∨ T ∈ E1 \ E2 then t ∈ E1 \ E2 for some t ∈ T . Otherwise,
T ⊆ E2, which implies ∨ T ∈ E2. This is a contradiction (in effect, E1 \ E2 and E2 \ E1 behave as Scott open).
Then T ⊆ E1 and (T) = 1(T).
The case for F ∈ T is straightforward, since we have∨ T = F . 
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With this, we can call  : F → L an amalgamation of 1 : E1 → L and 2 : E2 → L over  : D → L, in the
category (L ↓ L) of GDASs.
Remark 1. For x to occur in neither of the three cases (I), (II), and (III) in the deﬁnition for , x must be
the top element F . We can also let (F ) := L, which can be different from 1(E1) ∨L 2(E2). This is the
reason why amalgamation for GDASs may not be uniquely determined up to isomorphism, one of the reasons
to favor amalgamation over pushout. Note that letting (F ) := L amounts to the most conservative amal-
gamation, since it assigns the highest security level to the top element. The value 1(E1) ∨L 2(E2) we used
is the least conservative, because it is the lowest possible security class that one can assign to F . It would be
interesting to consider more general settings than Theorem 7, as well as the associated most conservative and
least conservative merged GDASs.
Remark 2. Here is a concrete example showing that pushout does not exist in (L ↓ L). Let L = {U ,C}, with
U < C and
D = {0},E1 = {0, a},E2 = {0, b}, F = {0, a, b,},
with 0 < a, 0 < b, and a, b incomparable. For sensitivity level mappings, let  and i (i = 1, 2) all map everything
to U .
Then for , there are two possibilities: 1() = U , or 2() = C , both serving as the candidate structure for
the desired pushout construct but there does not exist a mediating map between these two choices.
Remark 3. If we restrict the lattices to those which are approximable by ﬁnite lattices, then the subslice
of (L ↓ L) is ω-algebroidal [4] and therefore contains a universal (and homogeneous) object. However, the
signiﬁcance of such an object for security policy studies is unclear.
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